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MISSING STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY IN 







Washington has two long-term interests toward China: promoting a profitable,
equitable economic relationship and managing Beijing’s challenge to the U.S.-
led international order. Although recent policy has achieved many tactical suc-
cesses in these areas, the predominant record is one of broader strategic failure
in the face of the rise of China.
Keywords: U.S. policy, rise of China, military policy, economic policy, interna-
tional institutions
 
Assessing U.S. China policy in the beginning of the 21st
century requires more than tallying diplomatic initiatives and presidential state-
ments. The policy must be measured against the challenges of the times. The
rise of China is reshaping global politics. The task for Washington today is not
only to handle the relationship on a day-to-day basis but also to lay the foun-
dations for a long-term response to this rise.
China’s sustained growth is fundamentally shifting the overall economic bal-
ance among the world’s leading states. Since its reforms began in 1978, China’s
gross domestic product (GDP) has grown from less than 1% of global GDP to
over 5% today. This surge on the economic front has already permitted a sub-
stantial expansion of Chinese military capabilities and this will likely continue.
It is critical that Washington’s current China policy address this broader con-
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important shifts: the diffusion of highly destructive military technologies, eco-
nomic globalization, and the increase in transnational unconventional warfare.
This article focuses on the recent, post-September 11 era in U.S.-China rela-
tions because this period is an important point of inflection in overall Ameri-
can foreign policy. In the short to medium term, deterrence of potential Chinese
military threats has been bolstered. Yet, it is critical that Washington’s China
policy today contribute to the wider goal of sustaining the U.S.-led international
order that has prevailed since the 1940s. This requires a broader set of policies
than has been practiced in recent years. Intermittent advances are apparent in
this regard on the economic front, but the conditions are not yet in place to
sustain this progress. Worse, there has only been sporadic success in creating
the international conditions that will allow for burden sharing in efforts to ad-
dress the rise of China and to enmesh the country within the existing U.S.-led
order. Although the Bush administration has managed tactical, day-to-day bi-
lateral relations with efficiency and occasionally some deftness, the broader
strategic issue of a rising China has not been adequately confronted. In large
measure, this failure stems from the way the Bush administration has chosen
to respond to the consequences of 9/11.
The article also assesses how successful Washington has been in advancing
two long-term national interests toward China: preventing it from challenging
the U.S.-led international order and promoting a profitable and equitable bilat-
eral economic relationship. These enduring interests are discussed in turn be-
fore summarizing the policies implemented to achieve them. Along the way,
the many tactical successes of the administration in advancing these goals are
highlighted. However, this analysis also identifies the broader strategic failures
in the face of China’s rise and illuminates their concomitant facilitation of the
United States’s relative decline.
 
U.S. Interests toward China
 
In a complex society such as the U.S., myriad social groups, economic actors,
and governmental offices have their own perspective on national interests toward
China. This section outlines a rough amalgamation of these elements, mention-
ing economic issues and the promotion of liberalization in China but focusing
largely on ways to prevent Chinese challenges to the U.S-led global order.
 
Preventing Challenges to the Order
 
The U.S. has long had an interest in preventing challenges to its position atop
the pinnacle of distribution of power. This is not a new goal; its precepts run




 Although there is little the U.S. can do to
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The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century
 
 (New York:
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stop China’s relative rise in the long run, Washington can solidify the U.S.-led
order within which that rise occurs. Doing so not only ensures the narrow mil-
itary security of the nation but also allows Washington to shape the norms of





Of what does this international order consist? Fundamental to any such con-
ception is, of course, the web of alliance relationships that the U.S. maintains;
in Asia, this takes the form of a hub and spoke system of bilateral alliances.
However, the U.S.-led order is more than a set of narrow security commitments:
several important institutions and practices lie at its core. First is the post-




Second is the nonproliferation regime, at present embodied in a range of for-
mal institutions and informal practices from the non-proliferation treaty (NPT)
through the Zangar supplies group to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
Third, the institutions shaping the rules of international economic activity under
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other bodies have been built around
agendas set in Washington. Fourth, and most tenuously, there are domestic
governance norms that the U.S. has frequently supported, ranging from basic
humanitarian concerns to political issues such as corruption and the rule of
law. Finally, and most recently, there is an emerging norm on supporting ef-
forts to counter international terrorism. The U.S. has been able to enshrine this
in a series of U.N. Security Council Resolutions, deliberations in other inter-
national organizations (e.g., the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum,
APEC), and a wide network of bilateral relationships.
It is critical to avoid Chinese challenges to both the bilateral alliances and
the broader systemic structure that is maintained by U.S. predominance. What
policy tools might be used in the U.S.’s relationship with China to ensure that
Washington remains secure at home but also able to shape and maintain those




is the art of making contingent threats to convince an adversary
not to do something that it otherwise would have. In Sino-American relations,
Washington has an interest in preventing recourse to violence to achieve change
on the Taiwan issue. Indeed, U.S. interests arguably go beyond that pabulum
to include maintenance of the status quo until such time as a democratic reuni-
fication can be openly debated on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. also
has an interest in deterring any Sino-Japanese conflict, whether localized around
 
2. On the benefits of hegemonic provision of public goods, see Mancur Olson, 
 
The Logic of
Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups
 
 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1965).
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small islands in the Sea of Japan, or more expansive regarding competition
over energy or sea-lines of communication. In both these areas, the U.S. plays
something of a dual role, primarily deterring China but also restraining its own
allies. In Southeast Asia, Washington certainly has an interest in deterring sub-
stantial future military expansion into the region.




 is an elusive—and
expansive—concept. It refers to altering the relationship with potential adversar-
ies: changing their intentions and even their very status as potential adversaries.
Thus, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2001 spoke of “[d]issuading
adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten U.S.




 The QDR and related contem-
porary documents emphasize the development of such overwhelming military
dominance as to make inconceivable any attempt to compete in the adver-
sary’s mind.




 a potential adversary in an environment so thor-




 This component is particu-
larly important given the nature of the Sino-American relationship: an ongoing
shift in relative power. China’s rise will increase its ability to challenge the inter-
national system. However, it will be less likely to do so the more it is enmeshed
in the existing international order, because its leaders will perceive the order
as serving Chinese interests. Furthermore, the creation of ties to the existing
order will clarify Chinese challenges to the international system, if they come,
by serving as litmus tests for judging Chinese behavior.
These three strategic concepts can be fuzzy and overlapping. Long-term de-
terrence flows into the hard form of dissuasion, while enmeshing affects the
cost-benefit calculation in an analogous, if opposite, fashion. Measuring the suc-
cess of such broad “general deterrence” is hard enough; the difficulty is com-




 When not well integrated, these
separate strategies can lead to unintended consequences: efforts at overwhelm-
ing deterrence can provoke fears of aggressive intent, a classic security di-
lemma. This undermines the prospects for an enmeshing strategy to shape the
adversary’s interests in benign directions. On the other hand, when integrated
artfully, the three strategies truly have synergy. Weaving these three strands
tightly together can lash down the institutions of the U.S.-led order despite ero-




Quadrennial Defense Review Report 
 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2001),
p. iv. These themes are echoed in the 
 
National Security Strategy 
 





of 2001, among others.
5. Conceptually, it is useful to separate such enmeshing from the harder form of dissuasion. At
times in the QDR, the two are grouped together.
6. On the former, see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Rational Deterrence Theory:
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Profitable and Equitable Economic Relationship
 
Although the geostrategic interests described above are of paramount importance,
economic interchange underpins the political relationship. Economic interdepen-
dence between the two societies under discussion has a dynamic all its own; it
plays a role in shaping the very nature of national interests. The U.S. has a fun-
damental, independent interest in creating a profitable and relatively equitable
economic relationship with China. Sino-American two-way trade totaled nearly




 The U.S. is China’s largest export market, and China is
the fourth-largest export market for the U.S. Exports to China are the fastest
growing portion of America’s international balance sheet. Imports from China
have played a major role in keeping inflation low (both enabling and transcend-
ing the “Wal-Mart effect”). The sheer scale of current trade flows engenders their
importance for both sides. But at the moment, it is a lopsided relationship. In
this realm, the overriding goal is to shape the Sino-American economic relation-








One final area, which will not be assessed further, is the interest in continuing
domestic liberalization within China. For geopolitical reasons—democracies
rarely fight each other—and for humanitarian reasons, political liberalization
has been an important theme in American foreign policy toward most nations.




 In addition to political reform, the U.S. has
an interest in continued liberalization of the Chinese economy. This process sup-
ports the other interests, described above, by allowing for deeper bilateral trade
and financial ties. It also contributes to political liberalization through the empow-
erment of a middle class and the creation of social demands for various checks
on governmental powers (e.g., increased rule of law to reduce corruption).
That said, the U.S., like all outsiders, has only limited tools to influence po-




 Although the Bush administration has kept up
the conventional American criticism of the worst excesses of China’s authoritar-




7. Data in this section are from Thomas Lum and Dick K. Nanto, 
 
China’s Trade with the United
States and the World 
 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2007), RL31403, see













, accessed July 8, 2007.
8. Walter A. McDougall, 
 
Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the
World since 1776
 
 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997).
9. Furthermore, the United States has no interest in an accelerated rate of reform that might un-
dermine the basic political stability of the Chinese state. Civil war in a nuclear-armed behemoth
would have catastrophic costs.
10. On the failures of an earlier, more intense focus on human rights promotion in China by
Washington, see David M. Lampton, 
 
Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations,
1989–2000
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This section assesses the successes and failures of American policy in terms of
these interests. First, the economic sphere is evaluated: slow but significant prog-
ress is apparent in selected, narrow areas, although the conditions for sustain-
ing this have not been created. Then we chart the notable successes in enhancing
deterrence of threats to American interests and allies, both in the immediate
term and into the future. Next, the uneven record of enmeshing China in the
existing U.S.-led order is surveyed. The concluding section highlights the dan-
gers that this poorly balanced set of policies brings in provoking a wider chal-
lenge from China than might have otherwise existed.
 
Promoting More-balanced Economic Relations
 
In December 2006, the U.S. and China sent their top economic policymakers
to meet in the first session of the newly announced semiannual Strategic Eco-
nomic Dialogue. Led by Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, the U.S. delega-
tion included four other cabinet secretaries, three cabinet-level advisors from
other offices, and the new head of the Federal Reserve. Rarely has such a high-
powered team of American decision makers been sent abroad—ever. The Bush
administration clearly recognizes the importance of the economic relationship
with China, but what has it achieved in terms of promoting American interests
within this relationship?
According to American figures, China’s exports to the U.S. total nearly





though this $230 billion deficit figure likely overstates the deficit somewhat
because of biases in the way Hong Kong’s entrepôt trade is treated, the eco-
nomic relationship today is clearly unbalanced. Structural issues explain part
of this—low-skilled jobs in the U.S. face fierce cost competition from China.
These can be palliated through sectoral adjustment assistance, but not solved.
Other issues such as currency manipulation and barriers to trade are more ame-
nable to government-influenced solutions. It is here that Washington should be
judged. Three areas are discussed below: currency regimes; bilateral, sectoral
trade policy; and the global trading system.
The high point of the Bush administration’s economic policy toward China
has been prodding Beijing into relaxing its controls on the yuan. By mid-2005,
pressure was becoming acute. Senators Charles Schumer and Lindsey Graham
repeatedly threatened Beijing with a bill that would have levied a 27.5% tariff
on Chinese goods. Even moderate voices were calling for a 10% appreciation
of the Chinese currency. Former Treasury Secretary John Snow was under sub-
stantial pressure to designate China a “currency manipulator,” which would
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have mandated sanctions. This had been a sore point for a succession of trea-
sury secretaries from several administrations, and Snow made it a particular
emphasis. In July 2005, the People’s Bank of China announced an immediate
2% appreciation of the yuan and subsequently allowed a further 5% rise over
the next two years (see Figure 1). Beijing’s acquiescence in the subsequent
steady appreciation ran contrary to many analysts’ expectations. This gradual










 Given the continued increase in the Bank of China’s dollar hold-




 trade surpluses for China, Beijing
figure 1 A Clear Success: The Appreciating Yuan
SOURCE: Author’s chart, based on data from Foreign Exchange Rates (Washington, D.C.: Fed-
eral Reserve, 2007), Federal Reserve Statistical Release, H.10.
 
12. On the merits of this managed float over a sudden shock for transitioning China’s currency
regime, see Barry Eichengreen and Mariko Hatase, 
 
Can a Rapidly Growing Export-Oriented
Economy Smoothly Exit an Exchange Rate Peg? Lessons for China from Japan’s High-Growth Era
 
(Tokyo: Bank of Japan, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, 2005), Discussion Paper, no.
2005-E-9.
13. Mark M. Spiegel, “A Look at China’s New Exchange Rate Regime” (San Francisco: Fed-
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could not have sustained an undervalued currency much longer. Nevertheless,
U.S. pressure likely played a constructive role here.
This revaluation has not had an immediate effect on the trade imbalance—
nor should it be expected to in the short run. Trade patterns are fixed, and the
change in relative prices should lead to a temporary worsening of the balance,
the so-called J-effect. Nevertheless, the initial step to move away from a fixed
currency regime surmounted an important political hurdle. Given persistent
macroeconomic imbalances (and indeed recent steps to widen the band of per-
missible currency fluctuation), the People’s Bank of China will likely continue
to permit an appreciation of the yuan.
Thus, the Bush administration helped prod a policy—albeit one that Beijing
was likely to undertake eventually—that will eventually have a positive effect
on the overall balance of the economic relationship. However, administration
officials have done so in a narrow fashion: in the 1980s, the depreciation of the
U.S. dollar was carefully managed and coordinated in a multilateral forum




 Today, there is no
similar mechanism to facilitate such shifts that includes China, nor has the
Bush administration provided the leadership to create such cooperation. Had it
done so, the problems of future currency management would have been eased.
That would have been an important strategic achievement with the potential to
address future needs for macroeconomic coordination.
Turning to trade policy, the administration has at times advanced parochial
interests over free-trade norms. In 2002 Washington imposed tariffs on Chi-
nese steel. The next year, contrary to the spirit of the WTO but not to the letter
of China’s accession, Washington announced quotas on a range of textiles. Most
recently, the Commerce Department has charged Chinese firms with receiving
unfair subsidies in the production of high quality paper products. (This empha-
sis on Chinese subsidies sets a precedent that implies wide applicability to
other sectors; its compliance with WTO rules is uncertain.)
Other actions were more clearly consistent with WTO norms. Washington
filed its first WTO case against Beijing in 2004, alleging discriminatory treat-
ment of taxes on semiconductors. Through this and similar actions at the WTO,
the U.S. has registered minor gains from Beijing on a range of sectoral issues




 More recently, the U.S. Trade
Representative has also targeted through the WTO a variety of Beijing’s export
promotion tactics and intellectual property protections. It seems likely that some
gains for the U.S. will be achieved here as well.
 
14. Yoichi Funabashi, 
 
Managing the Dollar: From the Plaza to the Louvre
 
 (Washington, D.C.:
Institute for International Economics, 1989).
15. For useful discussions of these, see Gary Clyde Hufbauer, 
 
U.S.-China Trade Disputes: Ris-
ing Tide, Rising Stakes 
 
(Washington, D.C.: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics,
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Unfortunately, these gains in individual sectors are likely to be of only




 One seasoned observer of international trade
politics predicts that instead there will be a “continuing cat-and-mouse game
between the U.S. and China, as China targets additional industries for rapid




 Worse, the uneven
record of the Bush administration in addressing these issues through the WTO
is undermining a broader norm that the U.S. assiduously built over the post-
war era.
Finally, these bilateral issues represent only part of the economic challenge
China poses today. By virtue of its massive trade presence and growing out-
ward investment flows, China is increasingly creating webs of influence, par-




 For the most part, Washington can
do little about this: American power is finite and the country has wisely steered
away from close relations with many of these regimes on political grounds. That
said, when Beijing is excluded from other markets it is pushed toward such
countries. Furthermore, by abdicating a leadership role in the global economic
system, the Bush administration has left a void into which China has stepped
nimbly with a wide range of proposals and ongoing negotiations for regional
cooperation.
The Bretton Woods system is one of the clearest elements of the U.S.-led
global economic order: Washington has defined its agenda over six decades.
At times, the Bush administration has built upon previous administrations’
work to draw China deeper into this system. For instance, Treasury Secretary
Paulson has mooted the prospect of increasing China’s voting rights at the
IMF. It is clear that such efforts can have important benefits for the U.S. Since
the early 1990s, China has reformed parts of its own economy to enable it to
join the WTO; Beijing has been drawn deeper into this part of the global sys-
tem after accession in 2001. Two disparate examples illustrate the range of sac-
rifices Beijing has accepted just in the past few years. First, China has been
forced to treat Taiwan as an equal entity in front of a body empowered, by
Beijing, to make binding judgments. Unsurprisingly, Beijing has pushed back
 
16. Rather, as with U.S.-Japan relations in the 1980s, the tyranny of domestic fiscal deficits and
low savings rates will provide background pressure for current account deficits. Menzie D. Chinn,
 
Getting Serious about the Twin Deficits 
 
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2005), Council
Special Report, 10; Staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), “The Global Implications of
the U.S. Fiscal Deficit and of China’s Growth,” in 
 
World Economic Outlook: Advancing Structural
Reforms
 
 (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2004). An assessment of the merits of the Bush administration’s






18. E.g., Angola, Iran, Nigeria, Sudan, and Venezuela. See Phillip Saunders, 
 
China’s Global
Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools 
 
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies,
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at expressions of Taiwanese autonomy in this body, but even pessimistic ana-
lysts acknowledge that Beijing has had to make concessions to the legal struc-
tures of the WTO.
China has indeed changed its procedural behavior, from violation of to com-
pliance with WTO notification and consultation obligations. The WTO has pre-
scribed meticulous, binding rules for China and Taiwan to follow in all their
trade relations, including with each other. Compliance with laws is important
in multilateral organizations, particularly so for China while it is seeking wider




 Similarly, China has required its most advanced
firms, those listed on its leading stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen, to





 This is a major concession given that the na-
ture of corporate financial flows in most Chinese businesses is intentionally





 In both these cases, China has sacrificed some of its nar-
row self-interest or threatened core elements of its political economy to inte-
grate itself further into the U.S.-led global economic system.
Despite such advantages of enmeshing China in this system, Washington
has eroded the global economic institutions just as Beijing has increased its
participation in them. The Bush administration’s intermittent steps outside of
WTO norms described above—on steel, textiles, and paper—suggest a spo-
radic neglect of this institution by Washington. Worse has been the American
promotion of economic regionalism (through emphasis on bilateral free trade
agreements with South Korea, Singapore, Australia, and others) instead of









ther, the redirection of APEC toward terrorism issues has impeded the forum’s
ability to move forward on regional trade liberalization and indeed has alien-
ated many Asian nations with regard to this institution. These failings, while
problematic in general, are specifically failings of Washington’s China policy:
China has benefited from both of these moves by stepping into the resulting
vacuum and laying out its own vision of economic regionalism—one centered
in Beijing.
 





October 2005), p. 751.




, January 11, 2007.
21. See, for instance, Edward S. Steinfeld, 
 
Forging Reform in China: The Fate of State-Owned
Industry
 
 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
22. While this is typically a trend whenever the global talks stall, Washington—particularly
Congress—could do more to spur the global talks. On the former point, see Robert Gilpin and Jean
M. Gilpin, 
 
Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order
 
 (Prince-





 http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/47/4/536/11877/as_2007_47_4_536.pdf by N






ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVII, NO. 4, JULY/AUGUST 2007
 
The U.S. Congress’s decision to block the bid by the China National Off-
shore Oil Company (CNOOC) for Unocal in early 2005 exemplified this un-
dermining of liberal international economic norms. By allowing nationalism
to dominate debate, Congress sent an important pair of signals: China is not a
trusted partner and energy is not a normal commodity. Rather than commu-
nicate that China could obtain its needed natural resources through impartial
market-based transactions, the lesson imparted was vulnerability to the politi-
cal whims of Washington. Rather than reassure Beijing that it could thrive
peacefully under the U.S.-led order, China’s vulnerability to energy trade was
emphasized. Had Beijing rather been encouraged to (over)pay for oil access
in the free market, obtaining what it could at market prices, the merits of the
U.S.-led economic order would have been emphasized in China. Further, this
would have reduced the commercial pressure for China to turn toward abusive
and corrupt regimes in the Sudan and Angola to obtain its oil supplies.
By ceding leadership on international economic cooperation in Asia to China,
the Bush administration has failed to respond to an important challenge posed
by Beijing. By missing opportunities to draw Beijing into the existing U.S.-
led global economic system, Washington has failed to grasp an important stra-
tegic opportunity.
 
Deterring Chinese Challenges to 
Taiwan Today
 
Turning to security issues, in the Taiwan Strait the Bush administration has
balanced several concerns adeptly in the face of a very contentious Taiwanese
domestic political backdrop and a rapid Chinese military buildup. Washing-
ton’s policy must contain elements of dual deterrence, emphasizing the impor-





 Washington must also find ways of assuring Beijing that the Ameri-
can deterrence threat is indeed contingent. What Beijing fears most is Taiwan-
ese independence; thus, Washington has to convince Beijing that the U.S.
would not intervene to protect Taiwan if Taipei moves in this direction without
Chinese provocation. If Washington is unable to do this, the deterrence policy
could fail, not because Beijing questions the capabilities of American forces





Further, Taiwanese domestic politics poses substantial challenges to American
policy, but Washington has only limited influence on the island. The increase
 
23. Timothy W. Crawford, 
 
Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace
 
(Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003).
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in a Taiwanese, as opposed to Chinese, identity there suggests this will re-
main a contentious problem for an extended period. Recent polls in Taiwan




 but in the longer term, un-





national identity issues, immature democratic institutions in Taiwan carry their
own risks. Taiwanese political figures frequently resort to grandstanding on
critical national security issues, as seen, for instance, in visits to China by op-
position party leaders, or in President Chen Shui-bian’s referendum proposals.
Similarly, petty party competition has entangled an important military pro-




While for the most part these devel-
opments are beyond America’s ability to control, a degree of paternalism from
Washington can help ameliorate such problems. Washington must consider
carefully the implications of its moves on Taiwanese domestic politics. The
2001 arms sale package, and in particular the inclusion of extremely expensive
diesel submarines, failed in this regard, a failure that exacerbated Taiwan’s po-
litical problems while promising only limited strategic benefits.
Despite these difficulties, the Bush administration has fine tuned its policy
to leave the Taiwan Strait more stable today than it was in 2000. Efforts at de-
terring China have surpassed those of most previous administrations. In 2001,
Bush stated flatly that the U.S. would “do whatever it took to help Taiwan de-
fend herself.” His administration then approved the largest arms deal ever to
Taiwan and normalized the weapons procurement process for future sales.
Throughout its tenure, the administration has deepened military to military links
with Taiwan while assisting it in much-needed strategic and organizational re-
forms. As discussed below, the U.S. has leaned forward in its military posture
in the region. For these reasons, in the view of Michael Chase, the U.S.-Taiwan





U.S. deterrent posture is relatively unambiguous.
At the same time, the administration has sent a range of signals to Beijing—
and Taipei—that Washington was not supporting the de jure independence of
Taiwan. Most notable was a high profile statement by Bush made at Chinese
Premier Wen Jiabao’s side in December 2003. But many other low-key mea-
sures bolstered this message: the dispatch of National Security Council (NSC)
staffers to warn Taipei off provocative measures the following year; the diplo-
matic pressure put on President Chen to refrain from abolishing a reunification
office within the Taiwanese government; and numerous other statements on
 





(March/April 2006), pp. 141–48.
26. Melissa J. Brown, 
 
Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on
Changing Identities
 
 (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2004).
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referenda and territorial delineations of what the Republic of China actually
is. Although Chen’s ability to engage in verbal salami tactics on various per-
mutations of the independence issue is prodigious, the most recent provoca-
tions have not led to a substantial escalation of tensions.
Thus, despite extremely provocative leadership in Taipei, and notwithstand-
ing the continuing chance of misperception, today’s strategic stability in the
Taiwan Strait is a substantial achievement. Beijing’s military modernization
threatens to challenge the capability of a deterrent threat in the future, how-
ever. Responding to that potential is beginning to require a broader set of mili-
tary tools than the U.S. has traditionally maintained in the region. The next
section addresses these moves.
Preparing for Future Competition beyond Taiwan
Washington has also engaged in a range of policies and programs relevant to
potential competition with China in a broader area and in the longer term.
Washington has built up its military forces throughout East Asia. American
bases in Guam have been upgraded and are now home to several new forces.
The three new nuclear attack submarines based there will be able to triple their
time on patrol, in contrast to when they are based in the United States.28 A new
wing of B-52 bombers permanently based in Guam can reach throughout
Asia, and an enhanced headquarters unit will facilitate rapid reinforcement in
times of crisis—including by B-1 and B-2 bombers. Under the 2006 QDR, the
U.S. Navy’s surface fleet has shifted westward, with one aircraft carrier being
redeployed from the Atlantic fleet to the Pacific (bringing to six the number
stationed there, more than half the U.S. fleet). The exercise in 2004 that put
seven carriers to sea emphasized the Navy’s ability to mobilize this force in-
tensely. Finally, all of the navy’s SM-3 equipped Aegis ships (the Navy’s most
modern system) are deployed to Asia.29 That number has recently doubled,
from three to six, and is likely to continue to rise.
As far back as the mid-Clinton administration, Washington has been up-
grading ties with a number of Asian powers on China’s periphery. In North-
east Asia, the U.S. has made its alliances with Japan and South Korea more
robust and flexible, shifting their focus from deterring attacks on those two
countries to enhancing broader regional stability (albeit grudgingly). The Bush
28. Eric J. Labs, Increasing the Mission Capability of the Attack Submarine Force (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, 2002), CRS-3312.
29. Aegis ships (Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and Ticonderoga-class cruisers) possess an ad-
vanced suite of radars, combat systems, and interceptors giving them capabilities to defend large
areas from airborne threats. The SM-3 missile is the most successful ballistic missile interceptor
the United States possesses and is just entering service. Together, these systems give the Navy a
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administration has rescued the U.S.-Philippine alliance from oblivion, primar-
ily by focusing on anti-terrorism training, although this will reap a long-term
warming in the overall military relationship. The partnership with Singapore has
blossomed into a quasi-alliance with the signing of the 2005 Strategic Frame-
work Agreement. That will bolster the already robust current relationship, which
includes 100 ship visits a year and the stationing of a major command in Sin-
gapore. Washington has restarted military-to-military ties with Indonesia, and
other states—notably Malaysia and Thailand—have drawn closer to Washing-
ton in the context of the war on terrorism. Beyond these bilateral relationships,
Bush officials have reshaped the way the Pentagon thinks about foreign bases.
The Defense Department’s 2004 Global Posture Review (GPR) represents a de-
sire to reduce Washington’s susceptibility to political constraints imposed by any
one ally.30 The GPR aims to replace entrenched bases with more flexible “lily
pads” and “forward operating bases” for geographical and political flexibility.
Let us turn to investments in the future. Washington has taken forward-
looking steps that can be construed either as very long-term deterrence or per-
haps dissuasion of strategic competition. The Pentagon is planning to enhance
its conventional strike capabilities in ways that seem tailor-made to target China.
One of the few new weapons systems called for in the 2006 QDR is a long-
range penetrating bomber.31 Given that the U.S. can currently conduct strike
missions against any mid-sized power with existing stealthy B-2s and high-
speed B-1s, this new platform seems optimized to anticipate Great Power
conflict. The specific requirement for a “penetrating” platform suggests a per-
ceived need for strike assets that can reach deep interior regions inaccessible
to cruise missiles based offshore. As part of its Global Strike program, the
Pentagon’s Strategic Command is also shifting the way its Ohio-class ballistic
missile launching submarines (SSBNs) are armed. While a dozen or so boats
will retain their traditional roles as the backbone of the strategic nuclear deter-
rent, several others are being converted to launch long-range conventional
cruise missiles (SSGNs). Conventional warheads may be deployed on a few
ballistic missiles in each of the remaining SSBNs. These systems will have
comparative advantage over existing U.S. conventional strike platforms only
in the case of a conflict posing substantial threats to surface warships and car-
rier aircraft, even those beyond the horizon. The Navy is also aspiring to in-
crease its attack submarine procurement rate. All of these systems seem to be
designed with China in mind.
On the nuclear side, modernization of the arsenal continues even as the num-
ber of warheads deployed declines. This upgrading consists of enhancements
30. Formally, the document is known as U.S. Department of Defense, Strengthening U.S.
Global Defense Posture (Washington, D.C., 2004).
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in both reliability and accuracy. Washington’s aggressive promotion of na-
tional missile defense programs has led to the deployment of 15 interceptors
to date; double that number are scheduled for deployment by the end of 2008.
At that point, the U.S. will field more interceptors than China possesses ICMBs
(intercontinental ballistic missiles), according to current unclassified estimates.
Lastly, U.S. satellite systems are being modernized substantially with new pro-
grams such as the Space Radar and the SIBRS (Space Based Infrared System)-
High system.32 As described by Lieber and Press, this package of capabilities
calls into question the security of second-strike forces in China.33
With regard to conventional force development, the record is rather differ-
ent and is characterized primarily by various plaguing distractions. Although
military “transformation” was the highest priority of former Secretary of De-
fense Donald Rumsfeld during his tenure, it is clear that he was dissatisfied
with his ability to achieve it.34 This failure stemmed in part from competing
entrenched interests of the U.S. military services, but overall it is hard not to
blame the Iraq War as well. Iraq has fundamentally reshaped the priorities for
near-term technology development and strategic innovation and in doing so has
disadvantaged the Pentagon’s ability to maintain its lead over China. Rather
than addressing critical needs in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) to respond to
the frenetic pace of Chinese innovation and deployment, the Pentagon’s atten-
tions are focused on jamming garage door remote controls and cell phones
that trigger buried artillery shells. Rather than invest in advanced fighter aircraft
able to deploy far from China’s sizable short-range ballistic missile arsenal,
the Pentagon has had to bolt armor plates on its transport trucks. Similarly, the
emphasis on small-scale conflicts has emphasized littoral combat ships over
future destroyer development. These are particularly important failures because
these modernizations would not only enhance American capabilities in Asia
but would do so without being as provocative as other elements of the Bush
administration’s programs, as outlined in the strategic discussion above.
Stepping back from these particulars, we can reach several clear conclusions.
First, the peacetime (in Asia) redeployment of U.S. forces is considerable. Al-
though North Korean incitements certainly justify some of this movement, the
scale as well as some of the particulars of the deployment (SSN [nuclear-powered
32. These intelligence platforms will give the United States high-resolution data regarding ad-
versaries in general, and the latter system was originally designed to focus on ballistic missiles in
particular. While these systems would not be held at risk by Beijing’s recently tested anti-satellite
missiles and lasers, it would be shortsighted not to expect future Chinese research in this area.
33. Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The End of Mad? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Pri-
macy,” International Security 30:4 (Spring 2006), pp. 7–44.
34. Further, it is clear that current Secretary Robert Gates will push less on transformation than
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attack submarines] and SSGN, in particular) point to China as the target even
if diplomatic niceties preclude any explicit statements to that effect. This sends
signals to Beijing far beyond the Taiwan issue. It also enhances Washington’s
ability to deter challenges to a range of American interests throughout the Asian
region that China’s increased economic and military power might otherwise
call into question. Second, even though the various alliance relationships are
not seen in the region as efforts at “balancing China,” they do constitute a sort
of hedging that will allow Washington more easily to coordinate such a policy
if the need arises.35 The GPR-induced changes enhance Washington’s flexibil-
ity in this regard.
The Bush administration has certainly achieved its goals in most of these
areas (aside from the distractions affecting conventional modernization). Offi-
cial actions have created tools that serve general deterrence or dissuasion of
any expansionary instincts that Beijing might harbor. However, rigorous aca-
demic research suggests the efficacy of general deterrence, as opposed to more
proximate immediate deterrence, is at best ambiguous.36 Further, when taken
together, these moves are overly provocative and represent a dangerous imbal-
ance in American policy (as discussed after the next section). In short, the ad-
ministration’s pursuit of an inherently elusive goal has grave strategic costs,
alienating the very Chinese intentions that it is attempting to sway.
Enmeshing China in the U.S.-Led Order
Finally, Washington has sporadically attempted to enmesh China within the
U.S.-led order. If the U.S. fails, Beijing will work to undermine that order. A
similar Soviet effort crumbled as well, but it was hampered by a flawed eco-
nomic system destined to collapse. China has no such engrained defect and has
already begun to chart its own regional and global leadership path through ini-
tiatives such as the East Asian Summit, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
“Peaceful Rise” rhetoric, and the example of the “Beijing model” of economic
development (i.e., economic liberalization coupled with political authoritari-
anism). While these are not universally opposed to American interests, in most
cases it would be preferable for such initiatives to be captured within the exist-
ing U.S.-led order.
Former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s formulation of “re-
sponsible stakeholder” encompassed an important element of this approach by
35. Evan S. Medeiros, “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability,” Washing-
ton Quarterly 29:1 (Winter 2005/06), pp. 145–67.
36. The most comprehensive survey of the concept can be found in Patrick M. Morgan, Deter-
rence Now (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chapter 3, “General Deterrence.” Mor-
gan is pessimistic about its efficacy in general and about the persistent American reliance on it in
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asserting that China benefits from the existing international order and there-
fore should shoulder responsibilities for its maintenance. Under his leader-
ship, the State Department held annual meetings at the vice ministerial level
with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This regular “strategic dialogue”
served as an important venue to discuss issues of mutual—or conflicting—
interest at the broadest level. Although it is hard to identify any specific policy
that derived from such meetings in the past, Zoellick’s approach has created an
important line of communication between senior leaders on both sides.
Similarly on the military side, Washington has returned to a range of ex-
changes.37 Reinforcing a decision made as the Bush administration took office
in January 2001, the EP-3 incident kept military-to-military ties between the
U.S. and China to a bare minimum for nearly two years.38 The flagship of these
exchanges, the annual meetings at the undersecretary of defense level known
as the Defense Consultative Talks (DCTs), was not held in 2001 although con-
tacts at the assistant secretary level did occur that year. The Military Maritime
Consultative Agreement (MMCA) talks continued uninterrupted; ship visits and
the DCTs themselves were resumed in late 2002. More recently, the MMCA
talks have increased the number of working group meetings, although sub-
stantive progress remains elusive. The DCTs are now in their ninth year and
assistant secretary level discussions have been regularized. Invited Chinese
observation of U.S. exercises has increased over time, culminating in a sizable
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) delegation observing the three-carrier exer-
cise “Valiant Shield” in 2006. This seems likely to continue under the new
secretary of defense, Robert Gates, based on his confirmation hearing com-
ments and the recent successful visit of the outgoing chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace.
One important concern regarding these high level military and diplomatic
ties is their sustainability. The military links nurtured in the Clinton adminis-
tration were cut even before the EP-3 incident. At the State Department, the
outreach was closely linked to Zoellick; following his departure from govern-
ment service, the “strategic dialogue” series seems to have been downgraded
(it has been demoted in title to a “senior dialogue” and is now conducted at the
undersecretary level).
On global proliferation, Bush officials have labored, with significant suc-
cess, to draw China into emerging and established norms (again, norms pre-
dominantly shaped by Washington). Beijing’s leadership of the Six-Party Talks
37. For a rich summary of these, see Shirley Kan, U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for
Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2006), RL32496.
38. In this incident, a Chinese interceptor collided with an American intelligence plane over
international waters. The American plane landed safely, although in Chinese territory, where the
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has served to directly implement an important priority of the Bush adminis-
tration.39 On both Iran and North Korea, China has supported U.N. Security
Council resolutions under Chapter VII, making binding the call to sanctions
against both. The U.S. has dedicated an assistant secretary of state to focus
solely on the North Korea issue. Washington has also been able to elicit hints
that China is interested in American initiatives such as the PSI.40 The progress
on PSI is interesting given that Beijing is traditionally hypersensitive over
protecting the formal trappings of sovereignty as accorded under international
law. There are increasing signs that Beijing is accepting non-proliferation
norms more generally and more deeply in its foreign affairs bureaucracy.41
The Bush administration’s selective and low-key use of sanctions against Chi-
nese violations on export of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has likely
supported this (gradual) improvement.
In the war on terror, Washington has secured passive support from Beijing.
Initial assessments of substantial intelligence sharing between the two may have
been overstated, but Beijing has found it worthwhile to accept the framing of
the conflict that Washington prefers.42 Clearly, the international sanctioning
of Beijing’s characterization of the hitherto unknown East Turkmenistan Is-
lamic Movement as a terrorist organization with links to al-Qaeda was a great
boon for China (enabled by Washington). Beijing has gone further to support a
range of resolutions in the U.N., for instance, creating a venue for coordinat-
ing counterterrorism policy globally.
The Bush administration has had less success enticing the Chinese to join in
supporting emerging, if still tenuous, international norms on domestic gover-
nance issues. China has generally been reluctant to substantially pressure Sudan
over the conflict in Darfur and has tolerated human rights violations among a
number of other economic partners. That said, there has been only sporadic crit-
icism of China’s resource diplomacy and other initiatives leading to commodity
trade with regimes viewed negatively from Washington. In both cases, Washing-
ton under President Bush has expended relatively little effort on these issues.43
39. Christopher P. Twomey, “Explaining Chinese Foreign Policy toward North Korea: Navi-
gating between the Scylla and Charybdis of Proliferation and Instability,” Journal of Contempo-
rary China, forthcoming (2007).
40. Ibid., p. 23 ff. PSI aims to increase coordination among participants regarding monitoring
and interception proliferation related shipments at sea. It eschews formal organization and instead
is an example of the administration’s preference for informal, ad hoc “coalitions of the willing.”
41. Evan S. Medeiros, Chasing the Dragon: Assessing China’s System of Export Controls for
WMD-Related Goods and Technologies (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2005), MG-353.
42. Denny Roy, Lukewarm Partner: Chinese Support for U.S. Counter Terrorism in Southeast
Asia (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2006).
43. Indeed, it is striking that critiques of Chinese motives here are quite similar to those levied
against the United States’s own interaction with the periphery in the Cold War, where the nature
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Finally, as discussed previously, the record of enmeshing China in the U.S.-
led international economic order is scarred by important failures. Washington
has not drawn China toward the existing system; rather, at times it has actively
pushed Beijing away from it. Further, the U.S. has not promoted the growth
and deepening of the WTO and associated economic institutions in any sub-
stantial way in the past decade. Indeed, through its own pursuit of alternative bi-
lateral deals, the Bush administration has facilitated China’s efforts at the same.
In summary, progress has been made in enmeshing China in the U.S.-led
order, but it has always been halting in approach, incomplete in implementa-
tion, and replete with contrary currents. More fundamentally, as Beijing moves
closer to some of these norms and institutions, in many cases the U.S. is now
moving away from them. The Bush administration has denigrated formal legal
structures and traditional arms control agreements, favoring instead “coali-
tions of the willing” and flexible statements of principles (e.g., the PSI Prin-
ciples). The National Security Strategy has moved away from any significant
mention of international law as a contributor to American security, instead re-
lying on unilateral decisions for preventative war. In contrast, it is clear that
Beijing has increasingly come to regard the United Nations not as something
to be obstructed but as a useful tool.44 Unfortunately, just as Beijing moves
toward Washington’s historic position on institutions like the U.S.-created
U.N., the Bush administration has pulled the country away; indeed, officials
go out of their way to express their disdain for the U.N., in ways both petty
and substantive.
This move away from a centuries-old historic position on these issues has
costs. While it may be true that the post-9/11 era is unique, it is unlikely that
the utility of formal institutions has been fundamentally erased. Precisely this
cumbersome formality ensures an added degree of consensus about the nature
of the commitments the institutions entail. The formality also imbues them
with a permanence that empowers them beyond the underlying distribution of
power of the states that create them. It is reassuring to other actors that the
order they embody will not arbitrarily be used against them. By moving away
from this aspect of the U.S.-led order, the Bush administration has called into
question the nature of that order. This, of course, makes it harder to enmesh
Beijing in any particular aspect of it. By shifting the definition of the U.S.-
led order and weakening its structures, the Bush administration has reduced
America’s long-term ability to coopt the rise of China, a strategic failure of the
first order.
44. For a supportive description of Beijing’s evolution on core sovereignty issues within the
U.N., see Allen Carlson, “Helping to Keep the Peace (Albeit Reluctantly): China’s Recent Stance
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Challenges in Balancing Provocation 
and Deterrence
The current and envisioned military steps described earlier will do much to
deter any planned Chinese aggression, but it is important to recognize that these
measures by the U.S. can also send other messages. To the extent that Chinese
intentions are benign, this set of policies will be viewed as profoundly threat-
ening in Beijing. In part to reduce the chance of such a misperception, the Bush
administration has engaged in the range of diplomatic and military signaling
as outlined above. Unfortunately, the most prominent initiatives have been vul-
nerable to personnel shifts in the senior ranks of the administration or the vaga-
ries of daily headlines.45 In contrast, the weapons development and deployment
programs—the core elements of deterrence and dissuasion in the strategy—take
on a bureaucratic life of their own that is extremely hard to stop.46 This diver-
gence in processes leads to an imbalance in policy.
In practice, America’s muscular regional policy has sent signals that these
small steps can only marginally offset. The military redeployments to the re-
gion suggest that the U.S. military expects a fight. The bolstering of alliances
has also exacerbated Chinese fears of “containment.” If these changes—and
particularly the American relationships with Central Asia—are highlighted on
a map, it is easy to understand where a belief that “China is being encircled”
might originate. There is anecdotal evidence that fears of this scenario have
risen in Beijing.
The reduction in potential political constraints from allies that in part under-
lay the GPR also looks provocative: from Beijing’s perspective, those very
constraints serve as a positive check on American unilateralism. The direction
of U.S. long-term procurement and modernization is viewed as deeply threat-
ening in Beijing. In particular, the global strike program and the long-range
bombers carry an offensive overtone that is highly provocative—far more so
than steps Washington might have taken to enhance deterrence-by-denial over
Taiwan.47 While undoubtedly the budgetary politics behind the sustained 12%
real annual increases in Beijing’s defense spending play to complex constitu-
encies, these steps by the Bush administration certainly empower Beijing’s
hawks in those debates. Given the limited evidence for substantial Chinese ag-
gressive intent in the short term—beyond Taiwan, of course—it seems un-
likely that the benefits on the deterrence side of the equation outweigh this
negative spiral effect.
45. E.g., the departure of Deputy Secretary Zoellick or the EP-3 incident.
46. This has ever been true. James Kurth, “A Widening Gyre: The Logic of American Weapons
Procurement,” Public Policy 19 (Summer 1971), pp. 373–405.
47. Deterrence-by-denial reduces the ability of an adversary to achieve its aggressive goals by
militarily preventing success. In contrast, deterrence-by-punishment threatens to impose costs on




 http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/47/4/536/11877/as_2007_47_4_536.pdf by N
aval Postgraduate School user on 23 N
ovem
ber 2020
556 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVII, NO. 4, JULY/AUGUST 2007
Early signs of strategic competition are already apparent. While thus far
muted, and not yet meriting the inflammatory phrase “arms race,” it appears
that China is reacting to American missile defense deployments by enhancing
the ability of its strategic missiles to penetrate such defenses (i.e., penetration
aids). In space, the various Chinese anti-satellite weapons tests are an unsur-
prising response for a country that is attempting to discourage American inter-
vention in a Taiwan contingency.
In both these areas, it is not in the U.S. interest to engage in an arms race.
While the American technological advantages are substantial in each, both space
and strategic nuclear arenas are dangerous venues for competition. Space as a
battlefield is highly offense-dominant: the incentive to attack American satel-
lites early in a conflict is large. Similarly, given growing Chinese offensive ca-
pabilities, the U.S. will be pressured to attack Chinese ground stations needed
for targeting either lasers or missiles. Such an exchange would be extremely
costly to both commercial as well as military interests. Nuclear competition
between the Soviet Union and the United States was arguably relatively stable
for most of the Cold War because the competition never threatened the secu-
rity of the other side’s second-strike forces. That is not the case in current
Sino-American relations, and intensifying strategic competition may produce
unstable crisis dynamics.48
Conclusion: A Mixed and 
Lopsided Record
The recent successes in maintaining and enhancing U.S. deterrence capabil-
ities in Asia are important short-term achievements, as are the various im-
provements on economic issues. To characterize these as “short-term” is not to
demean their utility: without surviving short-term challenges, long-term strat-
egies cannot be implemented. Nevertheless, Washington’s failure to lay a foun-
dation for the long term—at a time when the threats in the short term are not
acute—is a major strategic omission.
Today, the U.S. is a declining hegemon. American global preeminence—
robust and widespread today—is not only guaranteed to be impermanent but
is currently waning, albeit slowly and in a relative sense. The rise of China is
an important part of the decline of the United States. It is likely that China
(and India) will continue to outpace American economic growth for decades
to come. Europe is also coalescing politically. By definition then, American
relative economic dominance is eroding; this will eventually percolate across
other spheres of power.
48. See Christopher P. Twomey, ed., Perspectives on Sino-American Strategic Nuclear Issues,
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There are other sources of America’s relative decline. While some aspects
of the “revolution in military affairs” have extended U.S. military dominance,
other shifts in the nature of military technology are less beneficial. Proliferation
of several military technologies has reduced the advantages that great powers
have typically held over smaller rivals. Nuclear weapons, and to a lesser extent
biological and chemical weapons, give small powers the ability to cause de-
struction on a scale that traditionally was available only after conventional
victory. Ballistic and cruise missiles similarly extend the reach of even poor
countries, pushing back their adversaries’ navies from their shores and allow-
ing for direct offensive action against airfields or cities.49 Air launched anti-ship
cruise missiles and capable diesel submarines may create “an empty ocean” in
future naval conflicts.50 Space, too, has this offense-dominant element.
China is taking advantage of this fundamental change in the nature of indus-
trialized warfare by focusing its substantial military investments on precisely
those technologies described above. Beyond Beijing, other regional and global
players are following the same path. All of this is reducing Washington’s free-
dom of action.
Further, globalization is shifting power away from nation-states in general.
While it is clear that reports of the death of the nation-state have been much
exaggerated,51 it is equally clear that the international economic flows that form
the backbone of globalization have risen to unprecedented levels.52 On issues
ranging from regulatory harmonization to macroeconomic policy writ large,
globalization provides new opportunities for sub-state actors and increases the
costs of many policy options for states.
These changes have not erased American preeminence, but they threaten
it today and will erode it tomorrow. This decline is unfortunate, and not just
for America. American hegemony has led to a remarkable degree of stability
among the Great Powers for the past 60 years and further paved the way for a
substantial expansion of democracy and flourishing of economic development.
Washington has the opportunity to manage and slow its own decline. No
hegemon reigns in perpetuity. However, not all collapse, and some continue to
play a leading role in the world far longer than an assessment of material foun-
dations would imply.53 By taking prudent steps now, the U.S. can do the same
49. Paul J. Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nu-
clear Age (New York: Harper Collins, 1999); Twomey, Perspectives on Sino-American Strategic
Nuclear Issues, ch. 3.
50. John Keegan, The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare (New York: Viking,
1989), p. 317.
51. An excellent source making that point can be found in Suzanne Berger and Ronald Philip
Dore, National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
52. Richard N. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Cen-
tury (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
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and maintain its leadership role in Asia for decades or more, despite China’s
rise. Unfortunately, this has not been done.
Missing Strategic Opportunities
Clearly, there have been important tactical victories. American alliance rela-
tionships in East Asia are stronger today than they were in 2000. The Taiwan
situation is relatively stable. The Pentagon’s ability to defend American inter-
ests if military conflict comes soon has also been enhanced. Important shifts in
the way China manages its currency were likely facilitated by Washington; the
administration’s intermittent use of the WTO has been constructive in enmesh-
ing China within that institution.
On balance, however, the failures of U.S. policy are more momentous. They
tend to occur on issues more important in the longer term or more strategic in
nature. Further, in most cases alternate policies could have paved the way to-
ward addressing the rise of China in the future: Managing the bilateral cur-
rency relationship is good; putting the dollar on a firmer footing in the long
run—which inevitably would require China’s cooperation and that of others—
would have been better. The Pentagon’s military modernization will certainly
create new capabilities for deterring China, but beyond Taiwan there is little
China can threaten today, and those same American capabilities are viewed in
Beijing as profoundly threatening. Minor successes on discrete proliferation
issues—North Korea, PSI—do nothing to make up for the broader collapse of
the proliferation regime. China has played a positive role in the former, at the
encouragement of the United States. The failures in proliferation have much to
do with technological change, but certainly have not benefited much from
American leadership in finding new solutions in the post-9/11 era.
The U.S. has applied its scientific might to pursuing technical solutions to
guerrilla warfare and guerrilla tactics—a Sisyphean task if there ever was one.
Instead, American scientific prowess could have been applied to anti-submarine
warfare, an area susceptible to technological fixes and critical to maintaining
deterrence in Sino-American relations. Rather than drawing China into a market-
based international energy economy, Congress succumbed to narrow national-
ism, prodding Beijing to intensify its search for oil among international pariahs.
A thin national missile defense system is likely warranted to address threats
from small states, but a thick, multilayered system with ongoing offensive strate-
gic modernization seems destined to provoke. Instead, Chinese concerns regard-
ing missile defense might have been assuaged through cooperative proposals
as have been offered to Russia.54
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More generally, American nuclear modernization is provoking China, among
other nations. Working toward consensus on the parameters of destabilizing
strategic competition could pave the way for its tacit avoidance. Similarly, on
the further militarization of space, it is important for the U.S. to shape the se-
curity environment in space so that China is not interested in challenging the
U.S. there. U.S. leadership in proposing verifiable programs leading to mutual
restraint would be constructive. The Bush administration has shown no initia-
tive in any of these three areas; in their abhorrence of traditional arms control
regimes, Bush officials have actively undermined the prospects for progress
on these issues. To be sure, two partners are required for the dance to enmesh
China in the U.S.-led order. But the Bush administration—through its broader
global policies and on specific issues like CNOOC and trade sanctions—has
made the U.S.-led order look less attractive to Beijing.
The rise of China, the diffusion of military power, and the role of globaliza-
tion are mingling to create an epochal shift. The attacks of 9/11 came rightfully
to dominate the administration’s foreign policy. The rise of radical, political
Islam certainly predates September 2001 and the 2003 American invasion of
Iraq, but the latter event has thrown an accelerant on those already-burning
flames. The war of choice that the Bush administration opted for in Iraq was
based on selective and faulty intelligence and spawned a botched occupation.
The distractions propelled by the war and occupation have greatly tainted Wash-
ington’s ability to face the most important challenge in America’s future. China
in important ways has benefited from these distractions and stepped into the
resulting voids.
Additionally, the Bush administration has alienated important security part-
ners with a stake in the current American-led system, partners who might be
expected to help Washington slow the pace of U.S. decline, when it eventually
comes. The administration has relied too heavily on military policies and failed
to balance these with economic and political leadership of the international
system. These failures too have negatively affected American interests vis-à-
vis China in the long term.
Had the Bush administration been less obsessed with remaking the Middle
East through military means, it could have laid a comprehensive foundation
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